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THE ROLE OF CANADA'S PRAIRIE PROVINCES 
IN CONSTITUTIONAL AND PARLIAMENTARY 
REFORM 
HOWARD CODY 
Canada's federation always has been tentative. 
This motley collection of French and English 
speakers, multiculturals and Native peoples, ex-
tended across a narrow ribbon of land just above 
the border with the United States, seems eter-
nally fated to endure tension and uncertainty 
concerning its national identity and political 
institutions. This uncertainty may now have 
reached its highest point in Canada's history. 
The 1990 failure of the Meech Lake constitu-
tional accord, which was intended to bring 
Quebec voluntarily into Canada's 1982 consti-
tution, has inspired an unprecedented quest for 
new constitutional provisions acceptable to Ca-
nadians throughout the country. 1 In this paper 
An associate professor of political science at the 
University of Maine, Howard Cody has published 
articles on Canadian federalism and policymaking 
in journals in Canada, the United States, Great 
Britain, and Australia. 
[GPQ 12 (Summer 1992): 147-1551 
147 
I make a necessarily tentative effort to consider 
the interests and involvement of one of Can-
ada's regions, the Prairie Provinces of Alberta, 
Saskatchewan, and Manitoba, at the present 
stage of the ongoing constitutional reform pro-
cess. 
The search for a new constitutional formula 
has assumed a sense of urgency, with a specified 
deadline. The Meech Lake accord would have 
entrenched in the constitution the designation 
of French-speaking Quebec as a "distinct soci-
ety." Many English Canadians, exemplified by 
Newfoundland Premier Clyde Wells, believed 
that this provision would have assigned to Que-
bec potentially extensive powers denied to the 
other provinces. Accordingly the Meech Lake 
accord was widely unpopular in English Canada 
and remains so. As the June 1990 deadline for 
unanimous provincial legislative ratification ap-
proached, the Newfoundland and Manitoba 
legislatures refused their assent. In reaction 
Quebec's government has proposed to stage a 
referendum on political sovereignty by late Oc-
tober 1992 unless English Canada offers by that 
time an acceptable formula for a redesigned fed-
eration. Quebec expects considerably strength-
ened powers in any new federation; its 
government already has identified twenty-two 
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desired new exclusive jurisdictions as its nego-
tiating position. Prime Minister Brian Mulro-
ney's government presented its own twenty-eight 
point bargaining position in September 1991. 
Among other provisions it would enhance fed-
eral control over Canada's economic union but 
allow provinces to negotiate with Ottawa greater 
autonomy over culture and other fields. Inev-
itably a redesigned federation would greatly af-
fect all of Canada, not simply Quebec or the 
Quebec-Ottawa relationship. All segments of 
Canadian society and all regions of the country 
must recognize and advance their interests in 
the constitutional reform process. 2 
At this juncture the stakes for the Prairies 
are especially high. The region occupies the vast 
and often unforgiving territory between pros-
perous Pacific Rim-oriented British Columbia 
and industrialized "fat-cat" Ontario. Most prai-
rie Canadians desire a well-financed and inter-
nationally credible federal government in 
Ottawa. Only a respected Canada can market 
prairie grain, potash, and oil and supply "de-
ficiency" payments and other supports that may 
be necessitated by poor world grain markets or 
low prices. At the same time, the thinly pop-
ulated Prairies remain alienated from the distant 
and majoritarian-oriented federal government 
and feel themselves powerless to affect national 
policymaking allegedly dominated for more than 
a century by the huge central provinces of On-
tario and Quebec. 3 Thus, prairie Canadians wish 
to keep a united Canada with a strong federal 
government while they simultaneously enhance 
prairie influence in national politics. This is a 
formidable dual assignment. 
Complicating the Prairies' approach to the 
constitutional crisis is western Canada's grow-
ing economic bifurcation. Alberta and British 
Columbia become steadily wealthier while 
Manitoba and Saskatchewan stagnate. Statis-
tics Canada reports that between 1970 and 1989 
Alberta's share of Canada's gross domestic prod-
uct rose faster than any other province's, while 
Manitoba's and Saskatchewan's shares declined 
faster than any other province's. A recent study 
of Manitoba and Saskatchewan urban centers 
blames federal government policies for "no 
growth or actual economic shrinkage even be-
fore the recession" in the two provinces. It warns 
that "without major economic retooling, Man-
itoba and Saskatchewan ... may soon become 
little more than hapless adjuncts to the (also 
distressed) U.S. regions of the northern plains."4 
In this paper I have utilized interviews with 
members of Canada's House of Commons (MPs) 
to address these issues. I interviewed eighteen 
Prairie MPs in their Ottawa offices in May 1991 
to ascertain their perspectives on their own pro-
vincial and regional interests in the looming 
constitutional talks. I also asked respondents for 
their suggestions and preferences for constitu-
tional change and parliamentary reform. Eight 
of the respondents come from Alberta, six are 
Manitobans, and four represent Saskatchewan 
constituencies. By party the respondents in-
clude eight Progressive Conservatives (Prime 
Minister Brian Mulroney's party), five New 
Democrats (social democratic party), three Lib-
erals, one Reform (right-wing western party) 
and one Independent. 
THE PRAIRIES IN CANADA TODAY 
Canada is a highly regionalized country. 
Canada's existing Senate, party caucuses in the 
House of Commons, some proposed formulas 
for constitutional amendments and Senate re-
form, and statistical information, are all orga-
nized on the basis of four or five regions. Atlantic 
Canada, Quebec, Ontario, and the West (or, 
sometimes, the Prairie Provinces and British 
Columbia separately) all enjoy regional status. 
This preoccupation with regional categories 
works against the Prairies. Western Canada is 
not nearly as homogenous as the four uniformly 
poor Atlantic provinces, much less the region-
provinces of Quebec and Ontario. Moreover, 
there remains the disputed British Columbia 
perception that the Pacific province should be 
classified as a fifth region of its own. British 
Columbia's semi-apartness enhances the West's 
diversity and further impairs the coherence of 
western contributions to national political life. 
Complicating this matter still further is the 
growing belief in Alberta that the province 
should forsake its prairie neighbors to forge an 
alliance with British Columbia in its dealings 
with federal authorities. 5 
Even when we consider British Columbia a 
separate region, the three Prairie Provinces di-
verge sharply in their economic and political 
interests and especially in their fiscal relation-
ships with Ottawa. Alberta is Canada's wealth-
iest province in respect to its independent fiscal 
capacity. It enjoys a much greater ability to raise 
revenues from its own sources (mostly oil and 
natural gas) than does any other province. Man-
itoba, most of whose residents live in econom-
ically stagnant Winnipeg, falls well into the 
"have-not" category of provinces that receive 
substantial "equalization" benefits from Ottawa 
to help them to provide services near national 
average levels. Grain and potash exporting Sas-
katchewan requires protection from the vagaries 
of weather and markets as well as equalization 
benefits. Until recently the "boom or bust" cen-
tral Prairies occasionally enjoyed high incomes 
from grain sales, but the near collapse of over-
seas markets has forced Saskatchewan to rely 
heavily on federal grain "deficiency" payments, 
which approximated $2 billion in 1991 alone, 
and grain prices reminiscent of the 1920s mean 
that prairie farmers "are going to need substan-
tial help from Canadian taxpayers" for some 
time to come. Inevitably Manitoba and Sas-
katchewan, but not Alberta, have become 
steadily more dependent on federal assistance 
since the 1970s. 6 Fiscal disparities alone can 
make Alberta appear to be "another country," 
as a Winnipeg Liberal MP described the prov-
ince. A rural Saskatchewan New Democrat went 
further, claiming that oil wealth has helped to 
"Americanize" Alberta in respect to its values 
and political culture. 
The sharp intraregional divergences cause the 
Prairie Provinces to advance quite different in-
terests or similar interests in unequal ways. When 
prairie provincial governments pursue "beggar-
thy-neighbor" policies, Alberta enjoys distinct 
advantages. To cite one instance among many, 
a rural Manitoba Conservative complained that 
Alberta subsidizes its meat packing industry 
through tax concessions that other Prairie Prov-
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inces cannot afford, thereby luring meat pack-
ing plants elsewhere in the West to move to 
Alberta. The same respondent admitted that 
the Conservative Party's western regional cau-
cus in Parliament finds it "hard to function" 
under these circumstances. 
Despite, or perhaps because of, the percep-
tion that the Prairies are "simply growing apart," 
Winnipeg Liberal MP Lloyd Axworthy recently 
appealed for the Prairie Provinces to coordinate 
their policies respecting grain pools, telecom-
munications systems, energy planning, the en-
vironment, and higher education. Such 
cooperation could enhance efficiency, increase 
bargaining power in constitutional and other 
national policymaking, and improve competi-
tiveness in international trade. Presumably the 
region could benefit from enhanced interna-
tional credibility, especially in the struggle 
against the European Community's agricultural 
subsidies. (On the other hand, a rural Saskatch-
ewan respondent observed that the greatest ob-
stacle to Canadian grain sales is the fact that 
Europe has become a net exporter of food.) In 
any case the early political and media responses 
to the Axworthy appeal were favorable but pre-
dictably pessimistic about the chances for in-
creased interprovincial cooperation on the 
Prairies. 7 
RESTRUCTURING THE CANADIAN 
FEDERATION: DIVISION OF POWERS 
With the present constitution apparently 
discredited, Canadians face six broad options 
for their federal system. The options are offered 
here in two groups, three of which maintain 
the principle of provincial equality and three of 
which repudiate it. Each group is presented from 
the most to the least centralized. The options 
are rebalanced federalism, asymmetric (or 
checkerboard) federalism, general decentrali-
zation, special status federalism, sovereignty-as-
sociation federalism (or institutionalized 
bipolarity), and full Quebec sovereignty. 
Three options would perpetuate provincial 
equality in principle if not in practice. Rebal-
anced federalism would reallocate several fed-
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era I and provincial jurisdictions that supposedly 
could be exercised more efficiently at the other 
level. Federal authority over free movement of 
people, goods, and services could be strength-
ened in return for, say, full provincial freedom 
over health and other social services. In the 
second option, asymmetric or checkerboard fed-
eralism, all ten provinces would be offered wholly 
new powers, such as unemployment insurance, 
and the complete freedom Quebec demands in 
at least some of the fields now shared with Ot-
tawa, such as health, energy, environment, in-
dustry, income tax, social and family services, 
communications, agriculture, manpower, re-
gional economic development, and language. 
Because provinces could pick and choose from 
the available offerings, some provinces would 
potentially retain much more extensive respon-
sibilities and a very different relationship with 
Ottawa than others, but officially all provinces 
would remain constitutionally equal. Canada 
already possesses various asymmetric arrange-
ments. 8 Under general decentralization, most 
or all of the above jurisdictions would be fully 
entrusted to all ten provinces whether they 
wanted them or not. Canada would then ap-
proximate a confederation whose member states 
have equal powers. 
The other three options would place Que-
bec, and only Quebec, in a distinct power po-
sition. Special status federalism, which appears 
to be the preference of the Quebec government, 
would extend full control over many jurisdic-
tions to Quebec alone, leaving Ottawa still par-
tially or wholly concerned with these activities 
in the other provinces. Quebec would remain 
as a province, enjoying continued federal assis-
tance and parliamentary representation. Sov-
ereignty-association or institutionalized 
bipolarity, the objective of Quebec's opposition 
Parti Quebecois, would have Quebec assume 
legal sovereignty and, its proponents hope, en-
joy the trappings of an independent state such 
as membership in the United Nations. A formal 
economic association with Canada would con-
tinue to exist, however, to administer a com-
mon currency and some sort of economic union 
through joint institutions. Finally, under full 
Quebec sovereignty, supported by the relatively 
few extreme Quebec sovereigntists, Canada and 
Quebec would maintain no greater institutional 
integration than Canada and the United States. 
Many functional links would remain possible, 
including free trade. 
Put briefly, prairie MPs suggested that their 
region wishes Canada to remain united, with 
all provinces on an equal constitutional footing, 
and much, although not necessarily all, existing 
federal authority retained. They would accept 
either rebalanced federalism or asymmetric fed-
eralism, particularly if federal supervision of the 
national economy and valued national insti-
tutions, such as the Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation, were preserved. The options that 
explicitly recognize Quebec's distinctiveness 
with special powers for Quebec alone encounter 
vigorous resistance in the West. They are widely 
interpreted as yet another outrage in which only 
Quebec gets what it wants while the legitimate 
concerns of other provinces are ignored. On the 
other hand, most prairie MPs believe that the 
confederal general decentralization option of-
fers a formula for national disintegration. Even 
Alberta Conservatives in Parliament-al-
though not necessarily their provincial govern-
ment-believe that a radically attenuated federal 
government would damage Canadians' national 
identity and allegiance. Saskatchewan and 
Manitoba respondents fear that a weak federal 
government would prove unable or unwilling 
to subsidize their provinces or to market their 
products abroad. This last concern is most acute 
in Saskatchewan, which already suffers from the 
same farm and small-town depopulation as the 
plains states south of the border. According to 
Robert Sheppard, 
nearly 85,000 people, mostly young and ed-
ucated, have left the province in the past 
five years. According to some accounts, 
nearly 1,000 farms have vanished each year 
since 1982, and with them have gone the 
jobs at the repair shops and machinery out-
lets, and the vibrancy of many small towns. 9 
Mindful of these perceptions, the Mulroney 
government has presented a proposal that com-
bines features of rebalanced and asymmetric fed-
eralism. The program includes essentially four 
provisions in this respect: Parliament would gain 
sweeping new authority to make laws that it 
declares necessary for the efficient functioning 
of the economic union, subject to the assent of 
seven provinces with fifty percent of Canada's 
population; a new mostly provincially ap-
pointed Council of the Federation would ratify 
certain federal economic policies on the same 
"7/50" basis; the provinces would receive the 
"non-national" residual powers now assigned to 
Parliament plus labor market training; and the 
current asym!lletry between provinces' powers 
would increase as Ottawa "delegates" various 
federal responsibilities, such as culture and im-
migration, through separate arrangements with 
each province, while provinces also "opt out" 
from federal spending programs (with compen-
sation) and from federal initiatives designed to 
advance the efficient functioning of the eco-
nomic union. The first two of these provisions 
are given little chance of surviving the coming 
negotiations. 
A different version of asymmetry, unmen-
tioned in the federal proposals but popular with 
many senior Canadian political leaders, is 
"CPP," or concurrency (shared federal and pro-
vincial jurisdiction) with provincial para-
mountcy (supremacy). 10 This system could prove 
more far-reaching than the federal proposals. 
Under this arrangement, each province would 
be offered the same extensive "menu" of new 
powers that Quebec is now demanding, and 
some new tax jurisdiction to fund them, with 
final provincial authority wherever each prov-
ince chooses. For example, if, as is likely, com-
munications were to appear on this list, a 
province could accept existing federal policy or 
implement its own communications policy 
whatever Ottawa or other provinces wished. A 
senior Alberta Conservative respondent called 
asymmetric arrangements available to all prov-
inces an essential element of a "face-saving" 
deal for the West, as Quebec would presumably 
make much more frequent use of delegation or 
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provincial paramountcy than the other prov-
inces. Through this device, each province could 
secure an informal special status in accordance 
with its self-defined interests while all ten prov-
inces theoretically remained equal. The Mul-
roney government acknowledges the influence 
of David Milne's recent essay on its consider-
ation of concurrency with provincial para-
mountcy.11 "Rebalancing" provisions to 
strengthen federal enforcement of free move-
ment from province to province could be in-
corporated into a delegation or CPP formula. 
Concurrency with provincial paramountcy is 
tempting as a resolution to Canada's constitu-
tional predicament. For Quebec to accept this 
arrangement, the menu of available new pro-
vincial responsibilities would have to be lengthy 
and inclusive. Quebec would probably assume 
all possible jurisdictions, but power-hungry 
provinces elsewhere, also exasperated with per-
ceived federal "interference" in their affairs, 
probably would seek delegation or paramountcy 
only in so much as they could afford it. Ac-
cordingly, two broad classes of provinces could 
result: Quebec and the three wealthiest prov-
inces, Ontario, British Columbia, and Alberta, 
likely would take over many more jurisdictions 
than the other provinces, including Saskatch-
ewan and Manitoba. The Atlantic provinces, 
Canada's poorest, would undertake the fewest 
responsibilities. A similar scenario also could 
unfold under the federal proposals, especially if 
"culture" is defined very broadly. 
Questions inevitably arise from such an ar-
rangement: If wealthy provinces assume the tax-
raising capability to fund their new responsi-
bilities, where will Ottawa find the money to 
finance these services in the "have-not" prov-
inces, which are now funded primarily by the 
richer provinces? Albertans contend that their 
province "lost" at least $50 billion in the 1970s 
and early 1980s when Ottawa forced them to 
sell their oil to the rest of Canada at prices well 
below world levels. Yet what would have hap-
pened to the national fabric if Alberta had gained 
this additional revenue at the expense of other 
provinces' residents? John Dafoe uses 1988 fig-
ures to show how fiscal federalism differentially 
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affects the provinces. In that year Alberta paid 
$1688 per capita more in federal taxes than it 
received in federal services. By contrast, Sas-
katchewan and Manitoba respectively received 
$1845 and $1521 more than they paid. 11 
Might Ottawa not become as crippled fiscally 
by CPP formula as in general decentralization? 
If each province exercised different powers, how 
would their MPs and cabinet ministers operate 
in Ottawa? Would they participate in federal 
policymaking involving jurisdictions that their 
own provinces had assumed completely? What 
about federal tax policies that would affect each 
province differently, some more so than others? 
Milne addresses the foregoing questions, but not 
those that follow. In any event his assurance 
that each province will be satisfied with its con-
tinued participation in federal policymaking on 
the current representational basis, because con-
currency with provincial paramountcy leaves the 
provinces theoretically equal, is not entirely 
convincing. Indeed, might not CPP or the fed-
eral proposals allow the great majority of MPs 
and cabinet ministers who are from larger prov-
inces to dominate federal policymaking in mat-
ters disproportionately or exclusively affecting 
the smaller provinces? How would the smaller 
provinces react to this situation? 
There is another question: Is there a suc-
cessful asymmetric federation in operation to-
day? The answer is yes. Malaysia gives Sarawak 
and Sabah, on Borneo, some powers not ex-
ercised by the states in peninsular Malaysia. The 
Bornean states enjoy full representation in the 
Kuala Lumpur parliament, but they have rela-
tively few people and small parliamentary rep-
resentation. There is no existing or historical 
example of the concurrency with provincial par-
amountcy variation of asymmetric federalism. 
RESTRUCTURING THE CANADIAN 
FEDERATION : PARLIAMENT 
While a reallocation of jurisdictional powers 
constitutes Quebec's overriding objective in 
Canada's constitutional crisis, residents of the 
Prairie Provinces consider parliamentary reform 
a more urgent priority. As the right-wing pop-
ulist Reform Party puts it, "the West wants in," 
namely access to power over federal policymak-
ing. This access can only be assured through 
parliamentary reform, especially reform of the 
presently appointive and ineffectual Senate, to 
offset Ontario and Quebec's majoritarian dom-
inance of the House of Commons. II Recall that 
a senior Alberta Conservative observed that the 
West may be persuaded to accept delegation or 
concurrency with provincial paramountcy as part 
of a face-saving arrangement. The other, pos-
sibly indispensable, component of this deal 
would be Senate reform. Since 1985 Alberta's 
provincial government has led the movement 
for an all-new "Triple E" Senate. This chamber 
would be elected, effective, and have equal rep-
resentation per province, much like the upper 
houses in Australia and the United States. Pub-
lic opinion polls routinely report that more than 
seventy percent of westerners desire a Triple E 
Senate. 14 
Senate reform presents a daunting array of 
difficulties, both in implementation and op-
eration. There are problems attending all 
components of Triple E, especially equal rep-
resentation per province. Despite the Austra-
lian and United States provisions for small state 
power through a Triple E Senate, or more likely 
because of the observed results of these prac-
tices, the governments of Ontario and espe-
cially Quebec lack enthusiasm for an 
arrangement in which their provinces, with 60 
percent of Canada's population, would supply 
only 20 percent of the senators. Largely for this 
reason, the new federal proposals call only for 
a "more equitable" distribution of Senate seats, 
without providing any definition of "equitable. " 
A new Senate's potential effectiveness is also 
controversial. Even Alberta proposes a mere 
suspensive (temporary) veto over most legisla-
tion and no veto at all over money bills. Under 
the federal proposal, the Senate would have no 
legislative role in raising or spending money but 
a six-month suspensive veto over matters of na-
tional importance such as national defense and 
international issues and a full veto on other 
legislation. Some Senate reformers maintain that 
there is little point in pursuing Senate reform 
unless the new chamber's powers and credibility 
approach those of the House of Commons. 1\ 
Moreover, there are disagreements over pro-
cedures for electing senators. Alberta wants all 
senators elected provincewide under the famil-
iar plurality (first-past-the-post) system. Some 
other reformers prefer senatorial districts inside 
provinces or proportional representation. The 
federal proposals specify only that senators be 
elected at the same time as MPs. Before Senate 
reform can be implemented, these and other 
details will require reconciliation of widely vary-
ing conceptions of the role and character of a 
new upper house. 
Prairie MPs betray markedly less enthusiasm 
for Senate reform than their constituents. Many 
MPs, both New Democrats and Conservatives, 
would like the upper house abolished alto-
gether. Understandably they perceive a strong 
Senate as an unwelcome limitation on their 
own chamber's powers. They also suspect that 
Ontario and Quebec will never accept Triple 
E. Moreover, one Alberta Conservative openly 
predicted that the seven "have-not" provinces 
would dominate a Triple E Senate. He believed 
that they would exploit any such chamber to 
induce Ottawa to transfer additional revenues 
from wealthy provinces like his own to poorer 
provinces such as Saskatchewan and Manitoba. 
Thus, a Triple E Senate would undermine Al-
berta's interests but not those of the other Prai-
rie Provinces. Additionally some MPs of all 
parties believe that a Triple E upper house blurs 
the cabinet's clear responsibility to the lower 
house, which is a long-cherished hallmark of 
the British-derived Westminster parliamentary 
system. Many Canadians believe that crises 
generated by Australia's Senate, especially the 
1975 affair that culminated in the dismissal of 
the government, suggests the inadvisability of 
a strong upper house in a Westminster parlia-
ment. 
Despite these reservations, many MPs con-
cede that public pressure and growing support 
for the Reform Party may force creation of a 
"Double E" (elected and effective) Senate that 
would replace equal representation per province 
with roughly equal representation per region or 
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a population-sensitive apportionment by prov-
ince. This might mollify Ontario and Quebec, 
but under regional near-equality the divergent 
interests of the Prairie Provinces would neu-
tralize much of the region's influence. British 
Columbia's claim to represent a region of its 
own also would have to be addressed in a re-
gionally oriented Senate, as would the divisive 
issues relating to powers and electoral arrange-
ments. Yet the specter of a Reform break-
through in the next election, due by the end 
of 1993, displacing dozens of sitting MPs of all 
other parties, especially Conservatives, appar-
ently has concentrated the minds and overcome 
the misgivings of the Mulroney government and 
many MPs of all parties on the Senate reform 
issue. 16 Surely Reform's right-wing program, 
which combines drastic reductions in federal 
taxes and social programs with an American-
style electoral system, contributes to the con-
sensus that the Reform threat must be count-
ered. 
Public support for Senate reform closely ac-
companies public exasperation with the nega-
tive and polarized environment, the narrow 
partisanship, and the publicly unaccountable 
voting behavior characteristic of the House of 
Commons. A highly placed Alberta Conser-
vative confessed that Canadians-perhaps 
Westerners above all-are "fed up" and want 
MPs to "clean up the place." The Reform plat-
form calls for MPs to operate without party dis-
cipline on all votes in committees and on the 
House floor, in line with constituency opin-
ion. 17 This runs utterly contrary to the familiar 
party-dominant parliamentary norms in Canada 
and other Westminster parliaments. The Con-
servative government and the major opposition 
parties are gradually, and grudgingly, preparing 
to offer backbenchers a much wider range of 
"free votes" in order to weaken Reform's appeal 
and to avert those still greater American-style 
evils that Reform also proposes, namely fre-
quent referenda and the recall of elected offi-
cials. Accordingly the federal proposals vaguely 
endorse more free votes for individual MPs. 
The Commons reform process, which re-
quires no constitutional amendments, has been 
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under way for some time. Since the late 1960s, 
but especially since 1986, MPs have acquired 
increasingly independent standing committees 
and better personal and committee staff sup-
port. 18 While Commons reform is universally 
acclaimed as an enhancement of MPs' general 
usefulness if not their policymaking power, there 
remains strong opposition in all parties-except 
Reform-to such an extension of freedom that 
Canadian MPs come to resemble members of 
the United States Congress. The features of 
Congress that the MPs I interviewed liked least 
are what they perceive as party weakness and 
interest group domination. Parliamentary re-
formers of both Canadian chambers will en-
deavor to prevent these evils from extending to 
Canada. Consistent with the Saskatchewan 
MP's description of Alberta as the most Amer-
icanized province, Conservative Alberta MPs 
admitted some admiration for the congressional 
practices of nonpartisan logrolling and the rel-
atively open committee investigations and bar-
gaining over legislation. Most respondents of 
all three major parties, however, still treasure 
party caucus solidarity. They insisted that par-
ties must be seen clearly to "stand for some-
thing" and that MPs should unconditionally 
declare themselves "in" or "out" on every issue. 
Those who even occasionally take the "out" 
position, opposing party policy, earned such ep-
ithets as "unreliables" and "flakes." MPs cannot 
be expected to assert much independence from 
party policy when confronted with a choice be-
tween collegial acceptance and social ostracism, 
even if more "free votes" are theoretically per-
mitted in the future. 
CONCLUSION 
What lies ahead for the Prairies? We cannot 
expect a coordinated regional strategy in con-
stitutional negotiations. Saskatchewan and 
Manitoba will seek to protect federal fiscal 
power, while Alberta, possibly joining British 
Columbia, will favor substantial tax and juris-
dictional decentralization. Alberta seeks Senate 
reform plus autonomy over energy (including 
royalties) and taxes. Senate reform on a Triple 
E model retains its allure throughout the region. 
Thanks to Quebec's sovereigntist potential and 
Reform's electoral threat, the likeliest outcomes 
include increasingly asymmetric federalism 
through delegation or concurrency with pro-
vincial paramountcy, a strengthening of the 
wealthiest provinces at Ottawa's expense, Sen-
ate reform on a Double E model (but with no 
absolute veto over all legislation), and limited 
enhancement of back bench MPs' independence 
from party leaders' control. Prairie public opin-
ion and all of the MPs interviewed for this paper 
probably could accept this package, but on the 
whole only Alberta in the region would benefit 
from it. 
Indeed, the long-term outlook for Saskatch-
ewan and Manitoba (and the Atlantic prov-
inces) is not encouraging. All of the "have-not" 
provinces may soon be left largely to their own 
devices as early victims of a more decentralized 
federalism. Ottawa policymakers may ask: "Why 
should-and how can-we keep paying Prairie 
farmers billions to produce (or not produce) 
grain that we cannot sell?" Delegation or con-
currency with provincial paramountcy would 
raise these and other questions relating to new 
federal jurisdictional and fiscal limitations and 
the perceived inefficiency and futility of equal-
ization and other support programs. Surely a 
Triple E or even a Double E Senate could en-
hance prairie participation in federal policy-
making, but it would prove cruelly ironic if less 
advantaged provinces finally secure influence 
over federal policymaking through Senate re-
form just as Ottawa surrenders the political will, 
the fiscal capacity, and the international cred-
ibility that these provinces need. 
NOTES 
1. For accounts by an English Canadian and a 
French Canadian of the Meech Lake process and its 
ultimate failure, see Andrew Cohen, A Deal Undone: 
The Making and Unmaking of the Meech Lake Accord 
(Toronto: Douglas and Mclntyre Ltd., 1990); and 
Pierre Fournier, A Meech Lake Post-Mortem: Is Que-
bec Sovereignty Inevitable? (Montreal: McGill-Queen's 
University Press, 1991). 
2. Joan Bryden, "English Canada Says 'No Way' 
to Distinct Society for Quebec," Montreal Gazette, 5 
June 1991, A12; Patricia Poirier, "Sovereigntists 
Winning Battle, Top Pollsters in Quebec Say," Globe 
and Mail (Toronto), 9 March 1991, AS; Rheal Se-
guin, "Canada First Choice of Liberals, Bourassa 
Says," Globe and Mail,S February 1991, AI; Gov-
ernment of Canada, Canadian Federalism and Eco-
nomic Union: Partnership for Prosperity (Ottawa: 
Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1991). 
3. For expressions of western alienation, see Re-
gional Representation: The Canadian Partnership (Cal-
gary: Canada West Foundation, 1981); David Kilgour, 
Inside Outer Canada (Edmonton: Lone Pine Publish-
ing, 1990); and David E. Smith, "Perennial Alien-
ation: The Prairie West in the Canadian Federation," 
in Michael Burgess, ed., Canadian Federalism: Past, 
Present and Future (Leicester: Leicester University 
Press, 1990). 
4. Statistics Canada, cited in Miro Cernetig, "How 
the West Won," Globe and Mail, 25 January 1992, 
Dl; David Roberts, "Plain Facts Show Prairies Hurt-
ing," Globe and Mail, 24 February 1992, AI, A6 
(quoted). 
5. Robert Sheppard, "Holding Hands Across the 
Rockies," Globe and Mail, 20 February 1991, A19. 
6. John Dafoe, "Record Low Prices on Biggest 
Crop Ever is a Bitter Irony for Grain Farmers," Globe 
and Mail, 3 August 1991, D2 (quoted); David Rob-
erts, "Western Premiers Expected to Focus on Econ-
omy," Globe and Mail, 13 May 1991, A3. 
7. Roberts, "Western Premiers" (note 6 above); 
Lloyd Axworthy, "Prairie Integration 1992," Speech 
before Manitoba Federal Liberal Policy Conference, 
Winnipeg, 11 May 1991 (mimeographed copy in au-
thor's possession), pp. 4-5; Jeffrey Simpson, "One 
Man's Welcome Departure from the Usual Liberal 
Rant," Globe and Mail, 17 May 1991, A16. 
8. David Milne, "Equality or Asymmetry: Why 
Choose?" Ronald L. Watts and Douglas M. Brown, 
eds., Options for a New Canada (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 1991), pp. 285-307. 
9. Robert Sheppard, "Empty Homes on a Full 
Map," Globe and Mail, 8 October 1991, A19. 
CANADA'S REFORM 155 
10. It will be difficult for Canadians to accept the 
initials "CPP" in this context because for a quarter 
century they have stood for "Canada Pension Plan." 
A detailed description of concurrency with provincial 
paramountcy and other options presently available 
to Canadians may be found in Ronald L. Watts, 
"Canada's Constitutional Options: An Outline," in 
Watts and Brown, Options (note 8 above), pp. 15-
30. 
11. Milne, "Equality or Asymmetry" (note 8 
above). 
12. On Alberta's argument see John Grimond, 
"Nice Country, Nice Mess," Economist, 29 June 1991, 
pp. 12-13; John Dafoe, "Canadians Alone Reduce 
Nationhood to Fiscal Fiddling," Globe and Mail, 23 
February 1991, D2. 
13. For a discussion of how Reform proposes to 
secure western access to federal policymaking, see 
Murray Dobbin, Preston Manning and the Reform Party 
(Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, 1991), pp. 
191-206. For the best discussion of Canada's existing 
Senate, see Colin Campbell, The Canadian Senate: 
A Lobby from Within (Toronto: Macmillan of Can-
ada, 1978). 
14. Alberta Select Special Committee on Upper 
House Reform, Strengthening Canada: Reform of Can-
ada's Senate (Edmonton: Province of Alberta, 1985); 
Cernetig, "How the West Won" (note 4 above). 
15. David Elton and Peter McCormick, Measuring 
Senate Effectiveness (Calgary: Canada West Founda-
tion, 1991). 
16. On the Reform Party's popularity and its im-
pact on Mulroney government policies, see Miro 
Cernetig, "Reaction to Reform Delights Calgary," 
Globe and Mail, 21 May 1991, A4. 
17. Miro Cernetig, "Could Preston Manning Pull 
It Off?" Globe and Mail, 30 March 1991, D4. 
18. For the best treatment of the parliamentary 
reform process to date, see C.E.S. Franks, The Par-
liament of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1987), especially pp. 161-85 and 219-26. 
